“(…) Apple and Nokia both want very badly to be the dominant mobile computing company for young adults. That makes a huge, relentless conflict between them inevitable.
(…) Nokia’s direction is very clear. It wants to be in the mobile Internet services business, as both a developer and publisher of content and services. It’s going to tie those services directly to its phones. And knowing Nokia, it’ll keep iterating on both the phones and the services until it gets them right.
(…) The operators lose control. They were struggling to establish their own services suites back when things were moving slowly. Now that Apple and Nokia are shifting into high gear, I don’t see how the operators can keep up.
(…) Who will be right? It depends on Nokia’s ability to generate user demand for its services. If the users want the services, the operators will have to go along with it. I assume Nokia understands this and is prepared to do a big marketing push. Unlike Nokia’s previous efforts to set up content portals, this time it has to succeed or it surrenders the future to Apple. So the conflict with Apple also locks Nokia into a war with the operators.
(…) There’s a disturbing possibility that we may end up exchanging one set of walled gardens for another. They’ll be lavish, beautiful gardens, far better than the operators’ truck farms for data. But we may not get the open data marketplaces that a lot of people have been hoping for. (…)”